University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Law Faculty Popular Media

Law Faculty Publications

5-2016

Copyright in a Nutshell for Found Footage Filmmakers
Brian L. Frye
University of Kentucky College of Law, brianlfrye@uky.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub_pop
Part of the Film and Media Studies Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.
Repository Citation
Frye, Brian L., "Copyright in a Nutshell for Found Footage Filmmakers" (2016). Law Faculty Popular Media.
31.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub_pop/31

This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Publications at UKnowledge. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Popular Media by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more
information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

Copyright in a Nutshell for Found Footage Filmmakers
Notes/Citation Information
Brian L. Frye, Copyright in a Nutshell for Found Footage Filmmakers, Found Footage Magazine, May 2016,
at 34.

This commentary is available at UKnowledge: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/law_facpub_pop/31

CO PY R I G H T I N A N U TS H E LL FO R FO U N D FO OTAGE FILMMA KERS. B RIA N L. FRYE

COPYRIGHT IN
A NUTSHELL
F O R F O U N D F O OTAG E
FILMMAKERS*

by BRIAN L. FRYE

Our Nixon
Penny Lane (2013)

CO PY R I G H T I N A N U TS H E LL FO R FO U N D FO OTAGE FILMMA KERS. B RIA N L. FRYE

Introduction
Found footage is an existing motion picture that is used as an element of a new motion picture. Found
footage filmmaking dates back to the origins of cinema. Filmmakers are practical and frugal, and happy
to reuse materials when they can. But found footage filmmaking gradually developed into a rough genre
of films that included documentaries, parodies, and collages. And found footage became a familiar element of many other genres, which used found footage to illustrate a historical point or evoke an aesthetic
response.
It can be difficult to determine whether found footage is protected by copyright, who owns the copyright,
and whether particular uses of found footage infringe copyright, especially in the case of unpublished
motion pictures. This article argues that copyright doctrine is unacceptably indeterminate and effectively
restrictive in relation to the use of found footage.

The Purpose of Copyright
Intellectual property is a general term for laws that create exclusive rights to use certain intangible goods,
like ideas and expressions. Copyright is a particular kind of intellectual property that gives authors certain
exclusive rights in the works of authorship they create. Notably, copyright does not apply to the tangible
copies of a work, but rather to the intangible work of authorship they embody.1
The Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution empowers Congress, “To promote
the progress of science (…) by securing for limited times to authors (…) the exclusive right to their (...)
writings.” Congress first used that power to enact the Copyright Act of 1790, which it has revised several
times, most recently in the Copyright Act of 1979.
The purpose of copyright is to encourage people to create works of authorship. As Samuel Johnson observed, “No man but a blockhead ever wrote except for money” (quoted in Boswell, 1976:302). Without
copyright, people could use works of authorship without paying for them. Copyright encourages the
creation of works of authorship by enabling authors to charge for certain uses of the works they create.
At least in theory, copyright is justified because the social cost of limiting the use of works of authorship
is exceed by the social benefit of the additional works of authorship produced.2

The Subject Matter of Copyright
Under the 1976 Act, copyright protects original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. In other words, copyright requires both originality and fixation.3 Found footage is typically protected by copyright, unless it has fallen into the public domain, because it is both original and fixed in a
tangible medium.

Originality
The originality requirement provides that copyright can only protect original works of authorship,
or works that are independently created by an author and display some minimal level of creativity.4 As a
consequence, copyright cannot protect facts, which are discovered, not created by an author, and can
protect compilations of facts only if they reflect some degree of creativity, or authorial judgment.5 In
addition, the idea/expression dichotomy provides that copyright cannot protect ideas, but can protect
particular expressions of an idea.6 The merger doctrine further provides that copyright cannot protect
the expression of a fact or idea that can only be expressed in a limited number of ways (Clayton, 2005).
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And the scènes à faire doctrine provides that copyright cannot
protect generic plots and characters.7
The purpose of the originality requirement is to ensure that
copyright does not conflict with the First Amendment, by
unduly limiting speech, or infringe on the public domain, by
protecting works that already exist.8 But the originality bar
is very low.9 While copyright cannot protect a telephone directory, it can protect almost anything else.10 Motion pictures
typically satisfy the originality requirement because they are
created by a cinematographer, who exercises authorial judgment about the subject of the motion picture.

Fixation
The fixation requirement provides that copyright can only
protect works that are fixed in a tangible medium, or recorded
in some way. The purpose of the fixation requirement is to
limit the scope of copyright protection to recorded works and
provide evidence of protected works (Lichtman, 2002:683 /
Donat, 1997:1363, 1400). Motion pictures typically satisfy
the fixation requirement because they are recorded on film
or video.11

Categories of Works of Authorship
The 1976 Act protects eight categories of works of authorship, including motion pictures. But a particular work of authorship may incorporate multiple categories of works of
authorship. For example, motion pictures often incorporate
a screenplay, set direction, a score, a soundtrack, and a series
of related images. The screenplay may be protected as a literary or dramatic work, the set direction may be protected as a
choreographic work, the score may be protected as a musical
work, the soundtrack may be protected as a sound recording,
and each image may be protected as a pictorial work. In other words, a particular found footage element may consist of
many distinct copyrighted works.

Original Elements
Copyright can only protect the original elements of a work
of authorship.12 As a consequence, every work of authorship
is effectively a compilation of discrete elements, some of
which may be original and protected by copyright, and some
of which may not. For example, a motion picture may consist
of images, dialogue, and music that are original and protected
by copyright, as well as facts and ideas that are not. A motion
picture may also incorporate pre-existing public domain elements, which cannot be protected by copyright.

a motion picture may
also incorporate
pre-existing public
domain elements,
which cannot be
protected by copyright
Ownership
Under the 1976 Act, obtaining a copyright in an original work
of authorship is easy, because copyright exists as soon as the
work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression. While registering a work with the Copyright Office provides valuable
benefits, it is not necessary.
But determining copyright ownership can be more difficult.
While copyright vests initially in the author or authors of the
work, the statutory author of a work made for hire is the employer. Whether a work is a work made for hire is often difficult
to determine, because it typically depends on a multi-factor
balancing test.13 And in any case, the owner of the copyright
in a work can license or transfer ownership of any element
of the work. As a consequence, copyright ownership is often
fragmented and unclear. Copyrighted works may be owned in
whole or in part by many different people, especially if more
than one person participated in the creation of the work, or
elements of the work were licensed or transferred.

Duration
The Intellectual Property Clause authorizes Congress to grant
copyrights for limited times. Initially, under the Copyright Act
of 1790, the copyright term was 14 years, renewable by the
author for an additional 14 years. But Congress gradually extended the term, and today it is typically the life of the author
plus 70 years. The Supreme Court has explicitly held that the
current copyright term lasts for a limited time, and has implied
that anything short of forever is consistent with the limited
times provision of the Intellectual Property Clause.14

Duration Under the 1976 Act

Exclusive Rights
The Copyright Act gives authors certain exclusive rights in
their works of authorship, which may include the exclusive
right to reproduce, adapt, distribute, perform, or display the
work depending on the nature of the work and the context in
which it is used. In other words, the Copyright Act enables
copyright owners to prohibit the use of original elements of a
work of authorship without permission.
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Unfortunately, the copyright term of a work of authorship can
be remarkably difficult to determine. The copyright term in
works created in 1978 or later is governed by the 1976 Act,
as amended, and lasts for the life of the author or authors
plus 70 years, or in the case of anonymous works and works
made for hire, 95 years from publication or 120 years from
creation, whichever expires first. So, in order to determine
the copyright term, one must first determine whether it is a
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work made for hire, and if not, one must identify all of the
authors of the work and determine if and when they died. But
in any case, works created in 1978 or later are protected by
copyright, unless they are expressly dedicated to the public
domain.15

Duration Under the 1909 Act
The copyright term in works created before 1978 is governed
by the Copyright Act of 1909, as amended, and can be even
more difficult to determine. Under the 1909 Act, the copyright term was 28 years from publication or registration, renewable for an additional 28 years, for a total potential term of
56 years. However, the 1976 Act increased the renewal term
to 47 years, and the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998
increased the renewal term to 67 years, for a total potential
term of 95 years.
But the 1909 Act also required compliance with certain formalities. Specifically, obtaining a federal copyright required
publication with notice, which consisted of the word “copyright” or symbol “©”, the year of first publication, and the
name of the author. Unpublished works were protected by
state common law copyright. And works published without
notice fell irrevocably into the public domain.
As a consequence, the definition of publication is critically important to determining copyright protection under the 1909
Act. While the 1909 Act did not define publication, courts
eventually held that a limited or investive publication created
copyright protection if accompanied by notice, and a general
or divestive publication destroyed copyright protection unless
accompanied by notice. Of course, whether a particular publication is investive or divestive depends on the context, and
courts tend to err in favor of the author.

Determining the Copyright Term
The upshot is that works published before 1923 are in the public domain, and works published in 1923 or later are protected
by copyright, unless the author failed to provide notice or renew the copyright term. But the copyright status of unpublished works is different. Typically, unpublished works created by authors who died before 1946 are in the public domain,
and unpublished works created by authors who died in 1946
or later are protected by copyright. However, unpublished
works made for hire and unpublished anonymous works are
in the public domain only if they were created before 1896.16

Infringement
If copyright owners believe that someone has infringed one
of their exclusive rights in a work of authorship, they can file
a copyright infringement action. In order to make out a prima
facie copyright infringement claim, the plaintiff must prove:
1) ownership of a valid copyright; 2) actual copying of one or
more original elements of the copyrighted work, and 3) substantial similarity caused by copying original elements.
To prove ownership, the plaintiff must show that the allegedly
infringed work includes one or more original elements that
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are protected by copyright, and must also show actual ownership of the copyright in those elements. In other words,
plaintiffs can file an infringement action only if they actually
own a work that is protected by copyright. Using a public domain element of a work cannot infringe copyright, because
no copyright exists, and does not even require attribution.17
To prove actual copying, the plaintiff must provide either direct or circumstantial evidence of copying. Direct evidence
is unusual, because infringers rarely admit to copying, so
plaintiffs tend to provide circumstantial evidence by showing access and probative similarity. In other words, a plaintiff
can prove copying by showing that the defendant had access
to the plaintiff’s work, and that similarities between the two
works support an inference of copying.18
And to prove substantial similarity, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant’s work is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s work, and that the works are similar because the defendant copied protected elements of the plaintiff’s work. In other words, you can copy facts and ideas with impunity, because
copyright can only protect the original elements of a work.
At least in theory. In practice, many courts have held that substantial similarity is a question of fact for the jury, and that
substantial similarity only requires copying the total concept
and feel of a work, which obviously may incorporate ideas and
generic elements.19 In other words, while copyright technically does not protect facts and ideas, it can effectively enable
copyright owners to prohibit the use of those unprotectable
elements of their works, by enabling them to prove an infringement claim without showing that the defendant copied
any specific original elements of their work.20

Limitations on the Exclusive Rights
of Copyright Owners
There are many statutory limitations on the exclusive rights
of copyright owners, most of which apply to specific categories of works or kinds of uses. For example, the first sale doctrine allows the purchaser of a copy of a copyrighted work to
resell their copy without infringing the copyright owner’s distribution right, and the mechanical license allows musicians to
create sound recordings or covers of musical works for a fixed
fee, without the permission of the copyright owner. But the
most important limitation on the exclusive rights of copyright
owners is arguably the fair use doctrine, which provides that
certain prima facie infringing uses of a copyrighted work are
non-infringing fair uses.

The Fair Use Doctrine
Fair use is a defense to copyright infringement. The purpose
of the fair use doctrine is to ensure that the scope of copyright
protection is consistent with the public interest and the First
Amendment.21 Prior to the 1976 Act, fair use was a common
law doctrine.22 While the 1976 Act codified the fair use doctrine for the first time, Congress’s intention was to restate the
present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.23
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Under the fair use doctrine, certain uses of copyrighted works
for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching
(including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research are non-infringing fair uses. Courts must consider four
factors in determining whether a particular use is a fair use:
1. The purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes.
2. The nature of the copyrighted work.
3. The amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.
4. The effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work.
In practice, the first fair use factor is the most important,
and courts primarily ask whether or not a particular use is
transformative.24 The purpose of the transformative test is to
ensure that copyright owners cannot prevent productive uses
of works of authorship:
The use must be productive and must employ the quoted matter in a different manner or for a different purpose from the
original. A quotation of copyrighted material that merely repackages or republishes the original is unlikely to pass the test;
in Justice Story’s words, it would merely supersede the objects
of the original. If, on the other hand, the secondary use adds
value to the original—if the quoted matter is used as raw material, transformed in the creation of new information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings—this is the very type
of activity that the fair use doctrine intends to protect for the
enrichment of society (Leval, 1990:1105, 1111).25

a fair use, or at least, is less likely to be a fair use than the
unauthorized use of a published work.29

Copyright & Found Footage
Found footage is an element of an existing motion picture that
is used as an element of a new motion picture.30 Filmmakers
use found footage in many different ways, but it is especially
common in documentaries and collage films, which may consist entirely of found footage.31
Unsurprisingly, the use of found footage may present an assortment of copyright issues. Of course, if found footage is in
the public domain, anyone can use it with impunity. For example, Bruce Conner’s film Crossroads (1976) consists entirely of found footage of the July 25, 1946 Operation Crossroads
Baker underwater nuclear test at Bikini Atoll (Wees, 2010).
The found footage was created by the United States government, so it is in the public domain, and Conner could use it
without permission.32
But if found footage is not in the public domain, using it
without permission is typically a prima facie infringing use,
so the user must either obtain permission to use the material, or make a fair use claim.33 However, it can be difficult

Room 237
Rodney Ascher (2012)

Economists would say that the fair use doctrine reduces transaction costs on authorship by allowing authors to make productive uses of original elements of existing works of authorship without permission. For example, quoting a sentence
from an existing literary work is typically a fair use, because
requiring authors to obtain permission before quoting would
be unnecessarily burdensome. Likewise, using an original element of an existing work in order to criticize it is typically
a fair use, because many copyright owners would refuse permission to critical uses.
But the application of the fair use doctrine can be unpredictable.26 For example, it can depend on the nature of the work
copied. Courts have typically held that quoting a sentence
from a literary work is a fair use, but that quoting a musical
phrase from a sound recording is not.27 And it can also depend on the nature of the use. While the fair use analysis is
theoretically objective, juries and courts both tend to consider
whether the alleged infringer acted in good faith.28
Finally, while the statutory fair use doctrine explicitly provides that the fact that a work is unpublished shall not itself bar
a finding of fair use, the Supreme Court has recognized a distinct statutory right of first publication, which affects the balance of equities in evaluating such a claim of fair use. As a result,
the unauthorized use of an unpublished work is typically not
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Let the Fire Burn
Jason Osder (2013)

to determine whether an element of a motion picture is protected by copyright. And if an element of a motion picture is
protected by copyright, it may be difficult to determine the
owner.
Ironically, using an element of a commercial motion picture
tends to present the fewest copyright issues, because the ownership of a commercial motion picture can usually be determined. Commercial films are typically published by distribution to the public.34 And the copyright in a commercial film
usually belongs to the publisher. So the copyright term of a
commercial motion picture is often relatively easy to determine. As a result, an author who wants to use an element of
a copyrighted commercial film can either request permission,
or make a fair use claim.
Of course, filmmakers may or may not receive permission to
use particular found footage, the terms of use may or may not
be reasonable, and fair use claims are inherently unpredictable, at least on the margins. But at the very least, found footage filmmakers can usually determine the copyright status
and ownership of a commercial motion picture.
For example, Rodney Ascher’s film Room 237 (2012) consists in substantial part of found footage copied from Stanley
Kubrick’s film The Shining (1980). The owner of the copyright
in the found footage is relatively easy to determine, because
Warner Brothers, Inc. registered copyrights in the screenplay,
images, and soundtrack of The Shining, and acknowledged
Stephen King’s novel The Shining (1977) as a previously existing copyrighted work. And the found footage was published,
because copies of The Shining were both sold and rented to
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the public. As a consequence, Ascher could either negotiate a
license with Warner or make a fair use claim to use the found
footage in order to comment on The Shining.
Similarly, Jason Osder’s film Let the Fire Burn (2013) consists
entirely of found footage, primarily television news broadcasts. The owner of the copyright in the found footage is relatively easy to determine, because the copyright in a television
news recording typically belongs to the station that produced
the recording. And the found footage was probably published,
because copies of television news recordings are typically sold
or rented to the public, often via stock footage companies. As
a consequence, Osder could either purchase a license from
a stock footage company or make a fair use claim to use the
found footage in order to comment on the events depicted in
the television news recordings.
However, the use of non-commercial found footage can present some of the most vexing problems in copyright law. The
Copyright Act assumes that works are created for commercial gain. And courts largely follow suit. But the Copyright Act
effectively provides that all original works are protected by
copyright, unless they are affirmatively placed in the public
domain. Every letter, fax, and email is protected by copyright,
as well as every home movie, home video, and vine.
Using an element of a non-commercial motion picture often presents difficult copyright issues, because it can be difficult to determine the copyright status and ownership of a
non-commercial film. In addition, it is often unclear whether
a non-commercial film was ever published, so it can be difficult to determine the copyright term.
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Our Nixon
Penny Lane (2013)

The Family Album
Alan Berliner (1986)

For example, Rich Bott and Jim Fetterley of Animal Charm
create video collages using found footage from discarded videotapes.35 The owner of the copyright in the motion pictures
they use is often unclear or effectively impossible to determine. But the motion pictures are typically published, because
they were sold to the public, often by their copyright owner.
As a consequence, Animal Charm effectively cannot license
the motion pictures they use, but can make fair use claims.
But amateur motion pictures and home movies present the
most difficult copyright issues. For one thing, their authorship
is often difficult or impossible to determine. Amateur motion
pictures and home movies are often acquired from third parties like film laboratories, collectors, antique stores, or flea
markets. They may or may not be accompanied by information indicating their provenance, like names or addresses. The
people named may be dead or impossible to find. And in any
case, third parties may have created or participated in the creation of the films. As a consequence, it is often difficult or impossible to determine who owns the copyright in an amateur
motion picture or home movie. And if you cannot identify
the owner of the copyright in a film, it is impossible to ask for
permission to use it.
Copyright scholars refer to works that lack an identifiable
owner as orphan works. They present a problem because copyright law assumes that people who want to use a work can
negotiate with the owner of the copyright in that work. But
under the 1909 Act, copyright protects many works that no
longer have substantial commercial value, and under the 1979
Act, copyright protects everything, whether or not it ever had
any commercial value. So many works with no commercial
value are effectively in limbo.
In addition, the overwhelming majority of amateur motion
pictures and home movies are unpublished, because they
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were never distributed to the public. Amateur motion pictures are typically shown privately, and rarely distributed to
the public.36 Home movies are typically private, and exist as
unique copies.37 As a consequence, the copyright term of an
amateur film or home movie is either the life of the artist plus
70 years or 125 years, depending on the author of the film.
For example, Our Nixon (Penny Lane, 2013) consists in large
part of home movies filmed by Nixon aides H.R. Haldeman,
John Ehrlichman, and Dwight Chapin between 1969 and
1973.38 But it is largely impossible to determine who created which home movies. Anyone could have been holding the
camera. However, the Nixon White House home movies were
nationalized by the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974. As a consequence, they
can be used by anyone, for any purpose, without permission.
But the Nixon White House home movies are the exception
that prove the rule. Most amateur films and home movies are
anonymous and unpublished. As a consequence, they are typically protected by copyright, at least in theory. For example,
Alan Berliner’s film The Family Album (1986) consists entirely
of found home movies, acquired from many different sources.
In other words, the found footage used in the film is anonymous and unpublished, and at least potentially infringing.
As a consequence, using found footage is almost always a potentially infringing or transgressive use of a copyrighted work.
Using an original element of a published commercial motion
picture is typically a prima facie infringing use, but is often
protected by fair use, if the new work is transformative. But
using an original element of an unpublished, non-commercial
work is typically not a fair use, at least under the prevailing
interpretation of the fair use doctrine, because it infringes the
right of first publication.39 Effectively, even transformative
uses of unpublished works may be infringing uses.
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Objections to the Fair Use Doctrine
Moreover, as Amy Adler has observed, the concept of transformativeness essential to the fair use doctrine is inconsistent
with many of the ways in which authors, especially artists, actually use elements of existing works (Adler). For example,
artists like Andy Warhol, Sherrie Levine, Richard Prince, and
Jeff Koons routinely use original elements of existing works
of authorship without transforming them in any of the ways
contemplated by the fair use doctrine. While their uses create
new meanings, they do so by changing the context in which
those works are presented, rather than changing the works
themselves.
Likewise, while many filmmakers use original elements of existing motion pictures in transformative ways that are protected by fair use, others do not. For example, many filmmakers
have created so-called perfect films, or unedited found footage presented as a work of authorship.40 Such perfect films are
non-transformative uses of unpublished works that would almost certainly be infringing.
In addition, as Andrew Gilden has observed, the open-ended
nature of the transformativeness inquiry tends to disadvantage
marginalized authors (Gilden, forthcoming publication in
2016). The transformativeness analysis increasingly relies on
a raw material metaphor that favors artists seen by courts as
cooking or recontextualizing the material they incorporate into
their work, rather than using it in its raw form. But this raw/
cooked dichotomy subtly encourages courts to privilege certain kinds of uses over others. While courts are increasingly
willing to find that rich and fabulous appropriation artists have
transformed the works that they copy by cooking the raw materials of culture, they are less willing to pardon lesser-known
artists. In other words, courts unconsciously respond to social cues. While blue-chip artists like Prince and Koons have
mounted successful fair use defenses based on recontextualization, socially marginalized authors are typically less successful (Gilden, forthcoming publication in 2016).

Perfect Film
Ken Jacobs (1985)
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Back to the Garden
Richard Prince (2008)

Of course, this could cut either way for found footage filmmakers, depending on their circumstances. It could benefit
well-established filmmakers, who can produce evidence of
the cultural significance of their works, at the expense of
marginalized filmmakers, who cannot. But to the extent that
found footage filmmaking is historically a marginal art form,
the transformativeness inquiry and its raw/cooked metaphor
are likely to disadvantage many found footage filmmakers, especially those who create perfect films and other found footage
forms that rely on minimal modification of the found footage.

Conclusion
The purpose of copyright is to encourage the creation of
works of authorship. The fair use doctrine is intended to complement copyright by facilitating productive uses of the original elements of works of authorship. But copyright and fair
use are both inconsistent with many artistic practices relating
to found footage. Copyright and fair use assume that authors
typically copy elements of commercial works, and are intended to distinguish between competing and non-competing uses
of the original elements of a work. But found footage filmmakers often use elements of unpublished motion pictures,
and often use elements of motion pictures in ways that are
inconsistent with the current interpretation of the transformativeness requirement of the fair use doctrine. Accordingly,
found footage filmmaking practices identify certain problems
with copyright doctrine and suggest the need for certain revisions. Specifically, courts should define transformativeness
more broadly, and should abandon the distinction between
published and unpublished works, in order to enable the productive use of historically significant motion pictures.

* While many aspects of the US copyright laws have been standardized through international copyright agreements, copyright laws
differ depending on country.
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14. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 199 (2003).
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neither copyright nor trademark can prevent the
unattributed use of a public domain work).
18. Plaintiffs typically prove access by showing
that the defendant had a direct connection to the
allegedly infringed work, or that the allegedly
infringed work was famous. Greg Dolin has referred
to these respectively as the Kevin Bacon (how
many degrees of separation?) and Leonard Cohen
(Everybody Knows the work in question) theories of
access.
19. Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald’s
Corp., 562 F. 2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
20. See, e.g., Williams v. Bridgeport Music, Inc., No.
LACV1306004JAKAGRX, 2015 WL 4479500, at *17
(C.D. Cal. July 14, 2015) (affirming a jury verdict of
copyright infringement based on the total look and
feel of two songs, without specifically identifying
any copied original elements).
21. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985).
22. See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9. F.Cas. 342 (C.C.D.
Mass. 1841) (Story, J.) (adopting an early version
of the fair use doctrine, based on English copyright
law). See (Reese, 2006:259).
23. 1976´s Copyright Law Revision (House Report
No. 94–1476)
24. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569
(1994) (“The central purpose of this investigation
is to see, in Justice Story’s words, whether the new
work merely supersede[s] the objects of the original
creation, (…) or instead adds something new, with
a further purpose or different character, altering the
first with new expression, meaning, or message; it
asks, in other words, whether and to what extent the
new work is transformative.”).
25. But see Amy Adler (consult bibliography), who
argues that the transformative test has failed art and
should be abandoned.
26. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig (consult bibliography)
claiming that fair use “simply means the right to
hire a lawyer.” But see Aufderheide & Jaszi (consult
bibliography) arguing that fair use has become more
predictable and useful.
27. Compare Faulkner Literary Rights v. Sony
Pictures Classics, 953 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D. Miss.
2013) (holding that a quotation from William
Faulkner’s novel Requiem for a Nun used in Woody
Allen’s film Midnight in Paris was a transformative
fair use) with Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the
use of an altered 2 second sample from Funkadelic’s
song Get Off Your Ass and Jam in N.W.A.’s song 100
Miles and Runnin’ was not a fair use).

a documentary, typically representing that the film
was made by one of the actors.
31. For example, Emile de Antonio’s Point of Order
(1964) is a documentary film that consists entirely
of found footage and Joseph Cornell’s Rose Hobart
(1936) is a collage film that consists entirely of
found footage.
32. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (providing that “[c]opyright
protection under this title is not available for any
work of the United States Government”).
33. Certain de minimis uses of elements of
copyrighted works are not infringing uses,
typically because the element used is insufficiently
substantial to qualify for copyright protection.
Newton v. Diamond, 388 F. 3d 1189, 1192 (9th Cir.
2004) (holding that the unauthorized use of a threenote, six-second element of a musical work was de
minimis).
34. United States Copyright Office, Circular
45: Copyright Registration for Motion Pictures,
Including Video Recordings, at: < http://copyright.
gov/circs/circ45.pdf > (“Publication of a motion
picture takes place when one or more copies
are distributed to the public by sale, rental,
lease, or lending or when an offering is made to
distribute copies to a group (wholesalers, retailers,
broadcasters, motion picture distributors, and the
like for purposes of further distribution or public
performance.”).
35. See Animal Charm website, at: < http://www.
animalcharm.com/index.html >
36. But see The Film-Makers’ Cooperative, and
Canyon Cinema, which enabled amateur filmmakers
to distribute films to the public, beginning in the
mid-1960s.
37. Home movies filmed on 16mm, 8mm, and Super8mm film were rarely copied, at least in part because
of the expense, and typically exist only as camera
originals. Home videos were also rarely copied,
largely as a function of indifference. Typically, copies
of home movies and home videos were created only
in order to facilitate presentation in a new medium.
For example, films were transferred to video, and
analog videos were transferred to a digital format.
38. See: < http://ournixon.com/about-the-film/ >
39. Cf. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985) (finding a right of
first publication).
40. The term perfect film was coined by Ken Jacobs,
who observed: “I wish more stuff was available
in its raw state, as primary source material for
anyone to consider, and to leave for others in
just that way, the evidence uncontaminated by
compulsive proprietary misapplied artistry, editing,
the purposeful pointing things out that cuts a road
straight and narrow through the cine-jungle; we
barrel through thinking we’re going somewhere and
miss it all. Better to just be pointed to the territory, to
put in time exploring, roughing it, on our own.” For
examples of perfect films see Ken Jacobs, Perfect Film
(1986); Hollis Frampton, Works and Days (1969);
and Brian L. Frye, The Anatomy of Melancholy
(1999).

28. Compare Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569 (1994) with Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
29. See, e.g., Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc., 688
F. 3d 1164 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the use of
unpublished photos was not a fair use).
30. The term found footage is also used to denote a
film genre that presents a fiction film as if it were
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